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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a decision of the Second Judicial District, Weber
County, entered by the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, denying the City's motion to
intervene in the Complaint and Appeal of a decision of the State Engineer concerning a
water application that was filed by Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District
("Taylor-West Weber"). The Utah Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(f) (1953 as amended), transferred
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Was the trial court correct in finding that Appellant, Roy City, lacks
standing to participate in this matter as a party because it failed to comply with the legal
requirements to become a party by filing a timely protest to Taylor-West Weber's
appropriation application?
Standard of Review of Issue 1. Standing is an issue of statutory interpretation,
which the court review for correctness. Washington County Water Conservancy District
v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, f 7, 82 P.3d 1125 (citing State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, ^ 4, 63
P.3d63).
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Issue 2. Was the trial court correct in determining that the Rules of Administrative
Procedure and the rules adopted by the Division of Water Rights prohibit intervention in
the Judicial Review of an order of the state engineer?
Standard of Review for Issue 2. "The interpretation of a statute . . . presents a
question of law[, which is] reviewed under a correctness standard." In re General
Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, 110 P.3d 666 (citations
omitted).
Issue 3. Was it clearly erroneous for the court to have concluded, that by failing to
file a timely protest to the application of Taylor-West Weber, Roy City failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies and is precluded from intervening in Taylor-West Weber's
appeal of the decision of the State Engineer?
Standard of Review for Issue 3. Statutory interpretation involving exhaustion of
remedies is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Issue 4. Does prolonging the time required for a trial de novo review of the state
engineer's decision, by asserting issues that are not disputed by the present parties, result
in undue prejudice, where the proceedings must be completed with the statutory period?
Standard of Review for Issue 4. Denial of permissive intervention is reviewed to
determined whether the trial court abused its discretion. M&S Cox Investments, LLC v.
Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315, % 20, 169 P.3d 789.

4833-0520-9859.TA003.002

-2-

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-3-202 in pertinent part:

(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-103 in pertinent part:

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or proceeding
described in Section 63G-4-102.
* * *

(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency
rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-203(g) (2008), in pertinent part:

(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of
adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency
shall, by rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings
that include the following:
* * *

(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state
permit intervention.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-401 in pertinent part:

(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-402(2)(b)

(2)(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(1) in pertinent part:
4833-0520-9859 TA003 002
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(1) Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer:
(a) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative
proceeding is informal; and
(b) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative
proceeding is formal.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 73-3-14(l)(a):

A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial
review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures
Act, and this section.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 73-2-1(5)

(5) The state engineer may make rules, in accordance with Title 63G,
Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, consistent with the
purposes and provisions of this title, governing:
(a) water distribution systems and water commissioners;
(b) water measurement and reporting;
(c) ground-water recharge and recovery;
(d) the determination of water rights; and
(e) the form and content of applications and related documents, maps, and
reports.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE

R655-6-1

A. These rules establish and govern the administrative procedures for
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Division of Water Rights as
required by Section [63G-4-203].
B. These rules govern all informal adjudicative proceedings commenced on
or after January 1, 1988. Adjudicative proceedings commenced prior to
January 1, 1988, are governed by R655-2.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE

R655-6-2

All adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Water Rights are hereby
designated as informal proceedings and include, but are not limited to, all
requests for agency action and notices of agency action concerning
applications to appropriate water, change applications, exchange
applications, applications to segregate; requests for reinstatement and
extension of time; proofs of appropriation and change; applications for
4833-0520-9859 TA003 002
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extension of time within which to resume use of water and proofs of
resumption of use; applications to renovate or replace existing wells;
permits and authorizations for dam construction, repair and use;
applications and other procedures for utilization of geothermal resources;
licenses and other permits for water well drillers; applications for stream
alteration; and other adjudicative proceedings involving water right
administration.
UTAH ADMIN, CODE

R655-6-3 in pertinent part:

A. "Adjudicative Proceeding" means a Division action or proceeding that
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all Division actions
to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend the
authority, right, or license; and judicial review of all such actions. Those
matters not governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b shall not be included within
this definition.
* * *

F. "Party" means the Division or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons permitted by the
Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized
by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative
proceeding.
* * *

K. "Protestant" means a person who timely protests an application before
the State Engineer pursuant to Section 73-3-7 or who files a protest
pursuant to Section 73-3-13.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE

R655-6-5 B.5.d.

B. Proceedings Commenced by Persons Other Than the Division.
* * *

5. Protests filed pursuant to Title 73, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 shall be filed
in accordance with the governing statutes and these rules.
* * *

d. Protests filed after the protest period has expired shall be placed on file
and become part of the record. Any person filing a late protest is not a party
and may receive notice of any further proceeding, hearing or order.
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UTAH ADMIN. CODE

R655-6-8

Intervention is prohibited except where a federal statute or rule requires that
a state permit intervention.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11

B

Any person not a party to the adjudicative proceeding may participate at a
hearing as a witness for a party or, upon the consent of the Presiding
Officer, may participate as part of the Division's investigative and fact
finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative proceeding
and may not seek judicial review.
STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
Roy City appeals an order of the District Court Judge denying intervention in a

trial de novo and appeal of an order of the State Engineer on an application appropriating
certain water rights in Weber County. Plaintiff and Appellee, Taylor-West Weber Water
Improvement District, filed an application for appropriation of water. (R. at 017-021.)
Upon receiving the completed application, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Utah
Code and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the state engineer set a deadline of
March 9, 2005, for interested persons to file protests to the application. (R. at 005.) On
September 21, 2005, a hearing was held on the application. (R. at 207.) It is undisputed
that the state engineer followed proper procedures in publishing notice of the
aforementioned deadline for protests and date of hearing.
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On October 10, 2005, seven months after the deadline for protests and more than
two weeks after the hearing on the application, the City submitted a letter to the State
engineer protesting the application. (R. at 121-123, 182.) Pursuant to the administrative
rules, the state engineer considered the content of the City's late protest and in his order
referred to the late protest and provided appropriate protections to the City. (R. at 125128.)
Taylor-West Weber formally requested that the state engineer reconsider the
portion of the order that limited the appropriation of water to a period often years. (R. at
035.) By rule, the request for reconsideration was denied by the failure of the state
engineer to respond to the same within twenty days of the filing thereof. (R. at 007, Tf 30.)
Taylor-West Weber then filed its Complaint and Request for Judicial Review of the order.
(R. at 001-048.) Roy City moved to intervene in the appeal. (R. at 146-148.) After
appropriate briefing and oral argument, the District Court Judge denied the motion on the
basis that the City had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, i.e. a timely protest in
the administrative proceedings, and lacked standing. (R. at 235-239.) In announcing her
decision, the District Court Judge reasoned that "Roy City missed the deadline . . . it was
a very, very late and untimely request to participate in the administrative process. Under
the rules, they're not a party." (R. at 257:33.) "[A]s a non-party . .. and late protestant
they don't have right to participate in the judicial review." Id. "To allow [the City] to go
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through the back door when they couldn't go through the front door . . . just doesn't make
any sense . . . ." Id.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,
On or about January 14, 2005, Plaintiff submitted an application to the Utah State

Engineer, seeking to appropriate a flow of 6.5 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water for
municipal purposes from wells located within its service Area. (R. at 017-021.)

Notice

of Plaintiff s application to appropriate water was published in the Standard Examiner on
February 10 and February 17, 2005. (R. at 207.)
The deadline established by the State Engineer for the filing of protests against the
Application was March 9, 2005. (R. at 094.) Protests filed after March 9, 2005 were not
timely filed. (R. at 194.) The State Engineer held an informal adjudicative proceeding
regarding Taylor-West Weber's Application on September 21, 2005. (R. at 207-210.)
Roy City filed a written protest of the Application, dated October 10, 2005, and
stamped "Received" by the Division of Water Rights, on October 13, 2005, more than
seven months after the deadline for receiving protests had passed. (R. at 178-180.)
On May 10, 2007, the State Engineer issued the order which approved TaylorWest Weber's Application, but for a fixed time of "not to exceed ten years". (R. at 207210.) The Order of the State Engineer acknowledges receipt of the late protest by Roy
City, but considered the City's concerns in the development of the Order. (R. at 207.)
The Order of the State Engineer specifically states that:

4833-0520-9859.TA003.002
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a. the "approval is granted subject to prior rights" (R. at 210.); and
b. the applicant shall be liable to mitigate or provide compensation for any
impairment of or interference with prior rights as such may be stipulated
among parties or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction. (Id.)
On May 30, 2007, Taylor-West Weber timely filed a Request for Reconsideration
of the Decision of the State Engineer. (R. at 212-216.) Taylor-West Weber's Request for
Reconsideration was deemed denied when the State Engineer failed to respond to said
request within twenty days of the filing thereof. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-302 (3)(b)
(2008).1
On July 19, 2007, within 30 days after the deemed denial of the request for
reconsideration of the Decision rejecting the Application, Taylor-West Weber timely filed
this action seeking judicial review. (R. at 001-048.)
Defendant Weber Basin Water Conservancy District filed its answer to TaylorWest Weber's complaint on August 23, 2007. (R. at 056-069.) Defendant Utah State
Engineer filed its answer to Plaintiff complaint on August 31, 2007. (R. at 082-092.)
Defendant United States Bureau of Reclamation filed a Special Appearance and
Voluntary Motion to Dismiss on October 25, 2007. (R. at 093-094.)

1

In the 2008 General Session of the Utah Legislature, the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act was renumbered from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. to § 63G-4-101
et seq., which renumbering became effective after briefing and oral argument on the
subject motion. For convenience, where the renumbering does not include changes to the
language of the section, references citation shall be to the renumbered sections.
4833-0520-9859.TA003.002
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On January 11, 2008, Roy City filed its Motion to Intervene in this action, together
with its supporting memorandum and proposed answer and counterclaim. (R. at 146189.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied Roy City's motion to intervene for lack of standing
and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The legislature authorized the Division of
Water Rights to enact rules governing the classification of proceedings and procedures to
be followed in proceedings. Rules enacted by the Division of Water Rights have the
effect of law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202 (2008). The applicable statutes and
administrative rules establish simple requirements that a person must meet in order to
become a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding on a water right's application. In
order to become a party a person must file a protest within twenty (20) days after
publication of the appropriate notice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(l)(a).
While to process to become a party at the appropriate time is simple, intervention
in the proceedings, specifically including judicial review of an order of the State Engineer
on an application for appropriation of water rights, is prohibited. "Any person not a
party to the adjudicative proceeding may participate at a hearing as a witness for a party
or, upon the consent of the Presiding Officer, may participate as part of the Division's
investigative and fact finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative
proceeding and may not seek judicial review." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11 B. (2007).
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Roy City seeks to become a party in a proceeding notwithstanding its failure to follow the
simple rules for becoming a party. In order to obtain judicial review person must have
standing by being a party or by being granted standing under an independent statute. See
In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545. Because Roy City was not a party in
the proceedings before the State Engineer, it has no standing to obtain judicial review.
Roy City acknowledges that it could not seek judicial review in this matter, (Brief
of Roy City, at pages 12-13). In S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a person that did not file a protest in proceedings before the
State Engineer did not exhaust administrative remedies and could not seek judicial
review. By moving to intervene in the present case, Roy City seeks , in the words of the
district court judge, ". . . to go through the back door when they couldn't go through the
front door . .. ." (R. at 257:33.)
Roy City attempts to distinguish S&G and other cases that uphold the exhaustion
of remedies doctrine by asserting that it is not really seeking judicial review, but is merely
seeking to participate in the judicial review that was sought by Taylor-West Weber.
(Brief of Roy City, at pages 13-14.) However, by definition Roy City seeks judicial
review where, by moving to intervene, it goes in search of, asks for and attempts to obtain
judicial review, without exhausting its remedies. (See Dictionary.com Unabridged
(v. 1.1), Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, Inc.
(2006)).
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The district court correctly determined that because Roy City failed to file a timely
protest, it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and lacks standing to intervene.
(R. at 257:33.)
ARGUMENT
I.

ROY CITY LACKS STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MATTER
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME A PARTY BY FILING A TIMELY
PROTEST TO TAYLOR-WEST WEBER'S APPROPRIATION
APPLICATION.
Roy claims that it may intervene in the judicial review of the State Engineer's

decision under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it meets the requirements
set forth in that Rule (Brief of Roy City, page 11). Roy's argument is based on the
following logic:
Judicial review of an informal proceeding is governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention upon the conditions specified in
Rule 24.
Roy meets the requirements of Rule 24.
Therefore, Roy argues, it should be permitted to intervene.
Roy City argues that intervention is governed solely by Rule 24, of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (Brief of Roy City, at page 13). However, Roy City misconstrues the
applicability of Rule 24 to judicial review of informal proceedings held under the Utah
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Administrative Procedures Act. Roy City's logic is flawed because, in order to be
allowed to intervene, before the Court even looks at Rule 24, Roy must demonstrate that
it has standing to intervene. Standing is determined under the Administrative Procedures
Act, which applies to judicial review by the district court. As will be shown, Roy lacks
standing and it may not intervene.
A. The District Court is Bound by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102 confers jurisdiction on the various district courts in
Utah. In Section 78A-5-102(7)(a), the legislature has provided that district courts have
jurisdiction to review "agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter,
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings" (emphasis added). The Rules of
Administrative Procedure " . . . establish and govern the administrative procedures for
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Division of Water Rights . . . . " UTAH
ADMIN. CODE R655-6-1 (2007). In Viktron/Lika Utah, v. Labor Com X 2001 UT App 8,
18 P.3d 519, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Judicial review of final agency actions is
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Id. at 520 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l)(a) (Supp.2000) (stating UAPA governs judicial review of state
agency actions).
Consequently, the district court, sitting for a trial de novo, does not act in a
vacuum, but is bound by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), as codified
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in Title 63 G, Chapter 4, of the Utah Code. Therefore, Rule 24 and Roy City's right, if
any, to intervene, must be examined through the lens of UAPA.
B. ROY City Is Not a Party Under UAPA.
UAPA defines those who are parties to administrative proceedings. Utah Code
Section 63G-4-103 defines a "party" as:
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency
rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
Under both this definition and the definition of a "party" under Utah
Administrative Rule R655-6-3-F2, Roy City is not a party. The Administrative Rule is
virtually identical to the statutory definition, the only difference being the addition of
"protestant" to the list of persons who may be parties. However, Rule R655-6-3 K
specifically excludes those who file late protests from the definition of a protestant. Roy
admits that it filed its protest after the time for filing had expired ("Roy City filed a
written protest of the Application on or about October 10, 2005, after the time for filing
protests had expired." (Brief of Roy City, at page 7)). A person who files a late protest is
not a party, though the person may participate in the adjudicative hearing. Utah
Administrative Rule R655-6-5B.5.d. Consequently, Roy City is not a party by virtue of
having filed a late protest.
2

The term "party" means ". .. the Division or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons permitted by the Presiding Officer
to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding."
4833-0520-9859.TA003.002
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Recognizing the importance of issues concerning water rights, the Rules provide
ample opportunity for any interested person to participate in an informal adjudicative
proceeding as a party. "Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer:
(a) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is
informal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-7(1) (1953 as amended). By availing itself of this
simple procedure an interested person becomes a party to the adjudicative proceedings
involving the application at issue. The term party as defined in the Rules ".. . means the
Division or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, ah
protestants, all persons permitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding,
and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an
adjudicative proceeding.55 UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-3 F. (2007) (emphasis added).
The application to appropriate water that was filed by Plaintiff constitutes an adjudicative
proceeding under the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure. UTAH ADMIN. CODE
R655-6-3 A. (2007).
The adjudicative proceeding that is the subject of this action falls within the
definition of an informal proceeding. "All adjudicative proceedings of the Division of
Water Rights are hereby designated as informal proceedings and include, but are not
limited to, all requests for agency action and notices of agency action concerning
applications to appropriate water
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R655-6-2 (2007).

Pursuant to the Rules as cited above, any person could become a party in the
matter of the application to appropriate water that was filed by Taylor-West Weber. All
that was necessary was to file a protest to the application within twenty days of the date
that the Notice of the application was published. In fact, except for the State Engineer,
each of the named defendants in the action became a party to these adjudicative
proceedings by virtue of having followed that simple procedure. (R. at 002-003.)
Although the Rules provide liberal opportunity for a person to become a party to
adjudicative proceedings by simple filing a timely protest, they are also very specific that
any person that files a late protest is not a party. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-5 B.5.d.
(2007).
In this case, Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District filed its application
to appropriate water on January 14, 2005. Notice of the application was published in the
Standard Exatniner on February 10, 2005 and also on February 17, 2005. Roy City
admits that it filed a protest on or about October 10, 2005. The City was entitled to, and
could very easily have, become a party in the adjudicative proceedings by filing a protest
on or before March 9, 2005. However, by failing to file until more than seven months
after the statutory deadline, the City was designated by statute as a non-party in the
adjudicative proceedings.
C. As a Non-Party, Roy City Lacks Standing Before the District Court.
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Rule R655-6-11 specifies certain rights and limitations of non-parties in
adjudicative proceedings as follows: "Any person not a party to the adjudicative
proceeding may participate at a hearing as a witness for a party or, upon the consent of
the Presiding Officer, may participate as part of the Division's investigative and fact
finding powers. Such a person is not a party to the adjudicative proceeding and may not
seek judicial review." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R655-6-11 B. (2007).
In In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545, the Supreme Court wrote:
Generally, a party lacks appellate standing when the party is denied
intervention in a proceeding and therefore is unable to participate below.
This is a corollary to the exhaustion of remedies requirement that must be
satisfied in order to appeal a Commission decision. In this case, however,
our appellate standing analysis does not end with affirming the
Commission's decision to deny Ball and Geddes intervention in the
proceedings. Utah Code section 54-7-15 grants standing to certain classes
of individuals to seek judicial review of Commission decisions regarding
public utilities. Nevertheless, such individuals are not given standing to
appeal any Commission decision, but must also be "aggrieved" or
"substantially prejudiced" by that decision. Thus, we must now determine
whether any individual petitioner in this case has appellate standing to seek
judicial review of the Commission's orders. Id. at ^f 44.
In the Questar case, the Supreme Court did not end its inquiry into whether the
petitioners, Bell and Geddes, had standing after determining that they were not permitted
to intervene at the lower level because of the existence of an independent statute, Utah
Code § 54-7-15, that granted standing to certain classes of individuals. In the present
case, no statute or rule permits Roy City to become a party, and no statute permits
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intervention. Indeed, Utah Code § 63G-4-203(g)3 expressly forbids intervention in an
informal adjudicative proceeding such as that before the State Engineer.
The Questar case stands for the proposition that, in order to be permitted to
intervene, a person must have standing and must also be aggrieved. This is in keeping
with the requirements of Utah Code § 63G-4-401: "(1) A party aggrieved may obtain
judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly
prohibited by statute."
Section 63G-4-401(l) mandates that in order to obtain judicial review, a person
must both be a party (have standing) and be aggrieved. Because UAPA defines a party in
section 63G-4-103, the use of the word "party" in section 63G-4-401 must be read to
mean an entity meeting that definition of a party. Because Roy City is admittedly not a
party, it may not obtain judicial review. Roy City has made an argument that though it is
not able to seek judicial review by filing a petition for review, it may nevertheless
participate in the judicial review by way of intervention (Brief of Roy City at page 12):
"A late protestant such as Roy City is not barred from intervening in a proceeding for
judicial review where, as in the present case, the intervenor is not seeking to commence
the judicial review". Again, at page 13, Roy City argues: "[T]his Court should order the
trial court to allow Roy City to intervene in this action under Rule 24 because Roy City is
3

"(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention." Utah
Code § 63G-4-203(g).
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not 'seeking' judicial review of the State Engineer's Order but is instead only seeking to
participate... ."). As section 63G-4-401 states, a party may not obtain judicial review
unless it is an aggrieved party. Because Roy City is not a party, it may not obtain judicial
review, either by seeking it as a petitioner or participating in the review as an intervenor.
Roy City attempts to show that it has standing by arguing that it is aggrieved (Brief
of Roy City at pages 15-18). However, as both the Questar case and Section 63G-4-401
point out, simply being aggrieved is insufficient. A person must also have standing by
being a party or by being granted standing under an independent statute.
Roy City argues that Utah Code section 73-3-14(l)(a) permits ^person aggrieved
by a decision of the State Engineer to obtain judicial review (Brief of Roy City, page 15).
That section in its entirety reads: "(l)( a ) A person aggrieved by an order of the state
engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section" (emphasis added).
In order to take advantage of section 73-3-14(l)(a), Roy City must proceed in
accordance with the UAPA, which includes being a party or otherwise establishing that it
has standing. Then and only then may it proceed to demonstrate that it is aggrieved.
Because Roy City cannot show that it has standing, the Court need not consider whether
or not Roy is aggrieved; Roy may not obtain judicial review.
Judicial review of the State Engineer's decision is governed by UAPA. The
district court must consider the provisions of UAPA in deciding whether to permit

4833-0520-9859.TA003.002

-19-

intervention by Roy City. UAPA clearly defines who is a party to an adjudicative
proceeding and prohibits intervention in informal proceedings. Because Roy City is not a
party as defined under UAPA, Roy lacks standing before the district court and the district
court properly denied Roy City's motion for leave to intervene.
II.

THE MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE
THE UTAH RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND THE
RULES ADOPTED BY THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS APPLY TO
THIS MATTER AND SPECIFICALLY PROHIBIT INTERVENTION.
The Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure ("the Rules") specifically prohibit the

intervention of Roy City in this matter. Roy City bases its argument in favor of allowing
intervention in this matter on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but ignores
the specific Utah administrative rules that apply. In section 73-2-1(5), the legislature
authorized "The state engineer [to] make rules,... governing . . . the determination of
water rights." Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-202, the rules adopted by the State
Engineer have the effect of law: "An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in
accordance with the requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-3-202(2) (2008). The ruling of the district court should be

affirmed because intervention is specifically prohibited in the judicial review of an order
of the State Engineer granting an appropriation application.
A. The Rules of Administrative Procedure Prohibit Intervention In The Judicial
Review Of An Informal Administrative Proceeding.
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Although Roy City now seeks to intervene in the judicial review, it is clear that the
right to intervene is proscribed by the UAPA and it could not have intervened at the
adjudicative proceeding level. Section 63G-4-203(g) states with respect to informal
proceedings: "Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit
intervention." Consequently, Roy City cannot claim to be a party by virtue of
intervention at the agency level, either.
Roy City does not meet the other definitions of a party given in either Section
63G-4-103 or R655-6-3-F. It is not the agency or other person commencing the
adjudicative proceeding and there is simply no statute or agency rule that allows it to
become a party. Therefore, Roy City was not a party to the adjudicative proceeding, nor
is it a party to the judicial review in the district court. Roy City admits this (Brief of Roy
City, page 10): "[I]t is true that Roy City filed a late protest and thus was not a 'party' to
the adjudicative proceeding before the State Engineer by virtue of being a
'protestant'. . . . "
Pursuant to the authority granted to state agencies to enact rules ". . . designating
categories of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally," UTAH CODE ANN. §
63G-4-202 (2008), the Division of Water Rights enacted Rule R655-6, which designates
all adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Water Rights, including applications to
appropriate water and judicial review of those decisions, as informal proceedings. UTAH
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ADMIN. CODE R655-6-2 (2007). Under the Rules of Administrative Procedure, the term
"Adjudicative Proceeding" includes judicial review of an order on an application to
appropriate water rights. "'Adjudicative Proceeding' means a Division action or
proceeding that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one or more identifiable persons . . . including . .. judicial review of all such
actions." UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-3A (2007) (emphasis added).
Rule R655-6-2 specifically includes: " . . . applications to appropriate water . . . . " ,
as adjudicative proceedings. UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-2 (2007). Therefore, the
Rules of Administrative Procedure apply to judicial review of an order on an application
to appropriate water rights. The action filed by Taylor-West Weber in this matter
constitutes judicial review of the order of the State Engineer. Black's Law Dictionary
defines Judicial Review as follows: "Judicial review, Form of appeal from an
administrative body to the courts for review of either the findings of fact, or of law, or of
both. See also Appeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 442 (5th ed. 1983).
In this case, the City seeks to intervene in an appeal from an order of the State
Engineer to the District Court. An appeal from the order of the State Engineer is an
appeal from an administrative body to the courts and as such is included in the definition
of judicial review and is therefore, an adjudicative proceeding to which the Rules of
Administrative Procedure apply.

4833-0520-9859.TA003.002

-22-

Rule R655-6-8 of the Rules of Administrative Procedure provides: "Intervention
[in an informal adjudicative proceeding] is prohibited except where a federal statute or
rule requires that a state permit intervention." UTAH ADMIN, CODE R655-6-8 (2007).
This prohibition is explicit and mirrors the language of the corresponding provision of the
Utah Code. "Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-203(g) (2008).

Therefore, unless a specific federal or state law requires, and the City has failed to
identify any such law, intervention by the City in the application of Taylor-West Weber
Water Improvement District is prohibited because: (a) Plaintiffs Complaint and
Administrative Appeal before the District Court is an informal adjudicative proceeding
for purposes of the application of the Rules of Administrative Procedure; and (b)
Intervention is prohibited in informal adjudicative proceedings.
B. The Specific Rules Prohibiting Intervention Take Precedence Over the General
Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Intervention.
The City argues that because a statute, section 63G-4-402(2)(b), states: "All
additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure," and Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
intervention if certain circumstances apply, the provisions of the Administrative Code
prohibiting intervention in the judicial review of a decision of the State Engineer are
inapplicable. (Brief of Roy City at 18-19). However, that argument is misplaced.
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Both provisions are based on statutory authority. Section 63G-4-402(2)(b), of the
Administrative Code provides for the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and
section 63G-4-203(g) states that intervention in an informal adjudicative proceeding is
prohibited. In determining which provision applies to a specific circumstance, the Utah
Supreme Court has consistently held that pursuant to the rules of statutory construction
specific statutory provisions take precedence over general statutory provisions. See eg.;
Cathco v. Valentiner Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365 (Utah 1997); Jensen
v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997).
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure apply generally to the proceedings in an
appeal of an order of the state engineer, that general applicability does not make the
specific rules prohibiting intervention inapplicable.
C. Recently Amended Section 73-3-14 Demonstrates Legislative Intent to
Preclude Intervention By Persons That Did Not File A Timely Protest To An
Appropriation Application.
During its 2008 General Session, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §
73-3-14 concerning the parties to be named in the appeal of a decision of the State
Engineer, and in so doing implied that late protestants are not included in the group of
potential intervenors in the action. Prior to the amendment, a party appealing an order of
the State Engineer was required to ".. . name the agency and all other appropriate parties
as respondents

" UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14 (2004) (Renumbered as § 63G-4-

401 by Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1391, eff. May 5, 2008). Prior to 2008, section 73-3-14(2)
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read: "The state engineer shall be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decisions,
but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation may be rendered against him.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 73-3-14(2) (2004). Amended section 73-3-14(7) states: "A person

who files a petition for judicial review is not required to: (a) notwithstanding Subsection
63G-4-401(3)(b), name a respondent that is not required by this section; and (b)
notwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-402 (2)(a)(iv), identify all parties to the adjudicative
proceeding. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(7) (2008).
The effect of amended Subsection 73-3-14(7) is that those persons who were
required to be named as respondents due to their filing timely protests, now need not be
named. Instead, the code provides: "A person who files a petition for judicial review as
authorized in this section shall: (a) name the state engineer as a respondent; and (b)
provide written notice in accordance with Subsection (5) to each person who filed a
protest in accordance with Section 73-3-7 of: (i) the filing of the petition for judicial
review; and (ii) the opportunity to intervene in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 24." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-14(3) (2008).
Notwithstanding Roy City's assertion that amended section 73-3-14 supports its
position on intervention, (Brief of Roy City, p. 19 fn 9), the amendment in fact suggests
that late protestants have no right to intervene. The required notice of the right to
intervene is sent only to those who filed timely protests. In quoting the language of the
amended statute, Roy City omits the critical and operable language ". . . in accordance
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with Section 73-3-7." Nothing in section 73-3-7 applies to late protests and nowhere in
the code is notice of intervention rights required to be sent to persons who filed late
protests. Considering the detail with which the administrative rules deal with late
protests, the legislature certainly could have included persons who filed late protests in
the group for whom notice of intervention rights is required, if it intended that such rights
existed.
III.

BY FAILING TO FILE A TIMELY PROTEST, ROY CITY FAILED TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND IS PROHIBITED FROM
SEEKING OR INTERVENING IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
ORDER OF THE STATE ENGINEER.

A. By Failing To Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Roy City Forfeited Any
Right to Participate As A Party In The Judicial Review Of the State Engineer's Decision.
UAPA requires generally that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to
judicial review.
A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that: (a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states
that exhaustion is not required; (b) the court may relieve a party seeking
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative
remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii)
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63G-4-401(l)-(2) (2008).

Although Roy City failed to file a timely protest, it now seeks to circumvent the
rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies by intervening in the judicial review.
"The fact that the remedy is no longer available does not, of course, alter application of
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the doctrine, as to hold otherwise would obviously permit circumvention of the entire
judicial policy behind the doctrine. Roth v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.3d 679, 687,
126 Cal.Rptr. 163, 168 (Cal.App. 1975) (citations omitted). The Roth case recognizes the
mischief that can be done by allowing a person to appeal to the courts after failing to
participate in the administrative proceeding below. Roy claims that it did participate, by
way of a late filed protest. (Brief of Roy City, at page 15.) However, the late protest did
not constitute exhaustion of remedies.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that participation in the administrative
proceedings is a prerequisite to judicial review. In S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085
(Utah 1990), a seller of water rights who did not file a protest or otherwise participate in
the hearing that was held on the buyer's proposed change application sought judicial
review. Notwithstanding the provision that any person aggrieved could seek judicial
review, the Utah Supreme Court held that the seller "waived its right to judicial review by
failing to participate in the administrative proceedings." The Court also emphasized:
"The requirement of participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies." Id. at 1087.
While acknowledging that it could not seek judicial review in this matter, (Brief of
Roy City, at pages 12-13) Roy City attempts to distinguish S&G and other cases that
uphold the exhaustion of remedies doctrine by asserting that it is not really seeking
judicial review, but is merely seeking to participate in the judicial review that was sought
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by Taylor-West Weber. (Brief of Roy City, at pages 13-14.) The City cites Utah
Assoc 'n of Counties v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995) as authority for its
position that seeking judicial review is restricted to commencing or initiating judicial
review. While Utah Assoc yn of Counties states that "[t]he right of a party to intervene in
an administrative hearing is different from standing to obtain judicial review", it was also
critical to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in that case that the Utah Association of
Counties had in fact satisfied the requirement of at least de facto intervention in the
administrative proceedings before seeking review. Id, at 820. The definition of the word
seek is not limited to commence or initiate. Random House dictionary defines Seek as
follows:
1. to go in search or quest of: to seek the truth.
2. To try to find or discover by searching or questioning: to seek the
solution to a problem.
3. To try to obtain: to seek fame.
4. To try or attempt (usually fol. By an infinitive): to seek to convince a
person.
5. To go to: to seek a place to rest.
6. To ask for; request: to seek advice.
7. Archaic. To search or explore.
- verb (used without object)
8. To make inquiry.
-Idiom
9. Be sought after, to be desired or in demand: Graduates in the physical
sciences are most sought after by employers these days.
Dictionary.com Unabridged (v. 1.1), Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary,
Random House, Inc. (2006). Moving to participate as a party in an action that is filed fits
squarely with the above definition. Roy City is in search of, asking for and attempting to
4833-0520-9859.TA003.002
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obtain judicial review through intervention, without first exhausting its remedies. In State
Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575 (Utah 1940), the Utah Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of exhaustion of remedies: "The omission of an imposed duty
designed to advise and administrative body of an event which sets its process in motion,
should not accrue to the advantage of the one who failed in the duty. This turns a delict
into a triumph." Id. at 578.
Intervention has also been held to be unavailable in cases involving Social Security
and Medicare benefits. "While a person seeking to intervene as a party plaintiff is subject
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, such requirement may be
waived as to an intervenor where exhaustion would be futile." 30 Fed. Proc, L. Ed. §
71:617 (September 2008) (citing Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1989)).
Despite reasonable efforts in researching this issue, Taylor-West Weber has been
unable to discover any Utah appellate case wherein a person failed to file a timely protest
to a decision of the State Engineer and then moved to intervene in the judicial review of
the decision. However, in City of Port Arthur, v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
13 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), the Texas Court of Appeals considered a matter
similar to the present case. In Port Arthur, "Southwestern Bell Company (SWB) filed an
application for rate group reclassification with the Public Utility Commission (the
Commission)." Id. at 843. The City did not participate in the administrative proceeding,
but later moved " . . . to intervene and requested reconsideration of the Commission's
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decision." Id. When the Commission, by inaction, overruled the City's request, the City
failed to request a motion for rehearing. Id.
When SWB then filed for judicial review of the Commission's decision in the
district court, " . . . the City filed a petition in intervention in the district court review
proceeding." Id. The district court denied the motion to intervene and the City appealed.
The Texas Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he City did not participate in the administrative
hearing in any capacity before the Commission issued its decision and did not obtain
permission to intervene in the administrative proceeding; the City therefore, was not a
party to the proceeding and does not have a statutory right to judicial review of the
Commission's decision." Id. at 844. Moreover, the Texas Court of Appeals determined:
The City cites this Court to no authority entitling one to intervene in a
district court suit for judicial review of an agency's decision concerning an
administrative proceeding to which it was not a party. Thus, it has failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in striking the City's
plea in intervention.
Id. The same statement should apply to the present case.
The rules that have been adopted by the Utah State Engineer promote this same
principle. In § 73-2-1(5), the legislature authorized "The state engineer [to] make rules,.
. . governing . . . the determination of water rights."

Those jurisdictional rules are very

liberal in allowing the participation of interested persons in proceedings regarding water
rights applications, but Rule R655-6-11 B is very clear: "A non-party to the adjudicative
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proceeding may not seek judicial review." That opportunity is lost by failure to act at the
proper time.
In this case, by missing the deadline by 7 months, the City lost its opportunity for
jurisdiction or standing in these proceedings. It now asks the Court to create jurisdiction
or standing in the Plaintiffs appeal of the State Engineer's order. Nothing in the City's
memorandum or reply establishes a right to be included as a party in these proceedings.
B. Cases Cited By the City do Not Support A Right To Intervene in An Appeal of
An Order of the State Engineer.
This matter is distinguished from other cases wherein intervention was permitted
based on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter constitutes judicial
review and an administrative appeal of the order and judgment of the Utah State Engineer
on the application to appropriate water rights that was filed by District.
Assuming, arguendo, that Rule 24 did govern the present case, Plaintiff would
assert that intervention was not warranted because the City's participation at this point is
untimely. In Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah
Court of Appeals denied the motion of an entity to intervene in a matter for the first time
on appeal. "Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may
intervene under proper circumstances. However, the rule contemplates timely
intervention at the trial court and not for the first time on appeal." Id. at 501 (emphasis
added).
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Moreover, Envirotech noted that "postjudgment intervention even in the trial court
is generally not permitted." Id. Envirotech cites the decision of the Utah Supreme Court
in Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983), holding that"...
postjudgment intervention should be allowed only upon a strong showing of entitlement
and justification, or such unusual circumstances justifying the failure to seek intervention
earlier." Id. (citing Jenner at 1074).
In this case, the district court is a reviewing court. A decision was already entered
by the State Engineer in the proceedings below. Roy City had ample time and
opportunity to become involved in these proceedings as a party. All that was required
was a timely protest. The City does not present that "strong showing of entitlement and
justification" that was required in Jenner. Neither are there any "unusual circumstances
justifying the failure to seek intervention [or participation] earlier." Id. The City simply
failed to get involved at the appropriate time and now seeks to re-open matters that have
already been determined by the State Engineer. (R. at 101-145.) Accordingly, even if
intervention in an administrative appeal was not prohibited by rule, denial of the City's
motion would still be appropriate.
IV.

INTERVENTION OF ROY CITY WOULD UNDULY PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFF IN THIS MATTER.
Taylor-West Weber would be unduly prejudiced by allowing the intervention of

Roy City in this matter in large part because of the severe time constraints imposed by the
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legislature in proceedings of this nature. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-15 (1953 as amended),
requires that this matter be completed within 2 years after the filing of the Complaint:
(1) An action to review a decision of the state engineer from an informal
adjudicative proceeding may be dismissed upon the application of any of
the parties upon the grounds provided in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the dismissal of actions generally and for failure to prosecute
such action with diligence.
(2) (a) For the purpose of this section, failure to prosecute a suit to final
judgment within two years after it is filed, or, if an appeal is taken from a
district court judgment within three years after the filing of the suit,
constitutes lack of diligence.
(b) A court shall dismiss those suits after ten days' notice by regular mail to
the plaintiff.
This requirement has been strictly enforced by Utah appellate courts. In Jensen v.
Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue as
follows: "We recently held that under section 73-3-15, when a party fails to take all
reasonable steps to secure a timely trial setting, the action should be dismissed. Id. at 292
(citing Blake v. Morgan, 782 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1989)).
Contrary to the assertion of Roy City, this matter when considered in its entirety, is
not in its infancy. (See R. at 153.) Plaintiffs application to appropriate water was
submitted to the State Engineer more than three years ago. A hearing was held and the
matter was under consideration for more than two years before the State Engineer issued
his Order. None of the Defendants in this matter chose to appeal the decision. In
response to Taylor-West Weber's Complaint and Administrative Appeal, one of the
Defendants, the United State Bureau of Reclamation, sought and was granted voluntary
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dismissal as a Defendant. Of the two remaining Defendants that filed answers, neither
has filed a counterclaim.
Although the district court is required to review the bases for the decision of the
State Engineer, see East Bench Irr. Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956); Shields v. Dry
Creek Irr. Co., 363 P.2d 82 (Utah 1961), based on Taylor-West Weber's Complaint and
Administrative Appeal and the answers filed by the two Defendants the only issue that
appears to be contested by the proper parties is the permissibility of that portion of the
State Engineer's Order that limits his approval to a term often years. Roy City now asks
this Court to allow it to not only contest additional matters, but also to litigate a counterclaim, which would certainly require a substantially longer period of time for discovery,
briefing and argument than the much more narrow issue that is now before this Court.
As a supplier of culinary water, Plaintiff is in need of the appropriated water at
this time. Each extension of time before the water can be put to beneficial use serves to
prejudices not only the Plaintiff and its customers, but also the policy of the State of Utah
that all water be put to beneficial use. See In re General Determination of Rights to Use
All of Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake and
Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, and Juab Counties,
2004UT67,98P.3dl.
Moreover, the interests of Roy City were already considered by the State Engineer
and its interests are protected by the provisions of the Order. The State Engineer is
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required to consider protests in approving or rejecting applications. UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-3-7(2) (1953 as amended). Pursuant to the Order, Plaintiffs rights to the water are
subordinate to all senior rights and Plaintiff is ". . . liable to mitigate or provide
compensation for any impairment of or interference with prior rights as such may by
stipulated among parties or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction." (R. at 127.)
Because the rights of the Plaintiff will be substantially prejudiced by permitting
intervention and litigation of issues already resolved, and because the rights of Roy City
were considered and are protected by the terms of the Order, the motion to intervene
should be denied.
CONCLUSION
The order entered May 5, 2008 by the Second Judicial District Court is correct.
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to affirm the same.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2008.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Mark H. Anderson
Brett B.Rich
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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